5 edition of Essays in radical empiricism found in the catalog.
Perry, R.B.Bibl. of W. James, p. 60, 1912, no. 1Editors preface signed: Ralph Barton Perry.First edition, cf. Perry cited below.Includes index.
|Statement||Longmans, Green, and co.|
|Publishers||Longmans, Green, and co.|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||xvi, 83 p. :|
|Number of Pages||97|
|Does consciousness exist? A world of pure experience The thing and its relations How two minds can know one thing The place of affectional facts in a world of pure experience The experience of activity The essence of humanism La notion de conscience Is radical empiricism solipsistic? Mr. Pitkins refutation of radical empiricism Humanism and truth once more Absolution and empiricism.|
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It is a burden to the flesh, and an injustice both to readers and to the previous writers, to repeat good arguments already printed. As an outer object, you must pay so much a month to inhabit it. But there is no test discoverable, so far as I know, by which it can be shown that the place occupied by your percept of Memorial Hall differs from the place occupied by mine. Bradley in short repeats the fable of the dog, the bone, and its image in the water.
It must be true of abstract units as well as of nouns collective; and if we prove it by concrete examples we must take the simplest, so as to avoid irrelevant material suggestions.
"La Notion de Conscience" French language, June, 1905• The result is that from difficulty to difficulty, the plain conjunctive experience has been discredited by both schools, the empiricists leaving things permanently disjoined, and the rationalist remedying the looseness by their Absolutes or Substances, or whatever other fictitious agencies of union may have employed.
This is how neo-realists like and interpreted James. That for working purposes we treat, and do well to treat, some relations as external merely I do not deny, and that of course is not the question at issue here.
To me the decisive reason in favor of our minds meeting in some common objects at least is that, unless I make that supposition, I have no motive for assuming that your mind exists at all. They cling together persistently in groups that move as units, or else they separate. Now this is a pure experience, a phenomenon, or datum, a mere that or content of fact.
VI The next objection is more formidable, in fact it sounds quite crushing when one hears it first. While physical things, namely, are supposed to be permanent and to have their 'states,' a fact of consciousness exists but once and is a state.
Only new-born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a that which is not yet any definite what, tho' ready to be all sorts of whats; full both of oneness 94 and of manyness, but in respects that don't appear; changing throughout, yet so confusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points, either of distinction or of identity, can be caught.
Conjunctive Relations Relations are of different degrees of intimacy. If we take conceptual manifolds, or memories, or fancies, they also are in their first intention mere bits of pure experience, and, as such, are single thats which Essays in radical empiricism in one context as objects, and in another context figure as mental states.
In opposition to this dualistic philosophy, I tried, in [the first essay] to show that thoughts and things are absolutely homogeneous as to their material, and that their opposition is only one of relation and of function.
Honestly, I had difficulty understanding James by reading this book.
It seems to me, as I said at the outset of this essay, that many minds are, in point of fact, now turning in a direction that points towards radical empiricism.
Personal histories are processes of change in time, and the change itself is one of the things immediately experienced.